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Abstract
This paper presents a growth model that can explain the coexistence of
intellectual property rights and R&D subsidies as a response to the presence
of both market and government failures. The framework can also generate the
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1 Introduction
The promotion of R&D is one of the most important items in the governments policy
agenda. I could not be otherwise since technological change is perceived as the main
source of sustained economic growth. Two main tools of R&D policy to foster inno-
vation are subsidies and patent protection. Both are widely used across nations, and
follow clear patterns along the development process. However, standard R&D-based
growth frameworks do not o¤er an explanation for why both tools are simultaneously
used. In these models, market failures justify innovation policy, and R&D subsidies
per se are able to achieve the rst best.1 Some of the literature on optimal intellec-
tual property rights (IPR) suggests reasons why innovation subsidies might not be
optimal, but never analyzes both tools jointly.2 The lack of an explanation within
a formal framework for the coexistence of di¤erent policy tools is an important gap
in a literature that tries to shed light on the optimal design of R&D policy and its
macroeconomic implications. This paper advances in that direction, and studies how
this coexistence depends on nancial and public sector considerations.
More specically, we propose an R&D-based growth framework that simultane-
ously explains patents and government-nanced R&D as a response to the existence
of both market and government failures. In the model, market failures include in-
tertemporal knowledge spillovers, diminishing returns to R&D e¤ort, and monopoly
pricing. The public sector, on the other hand, fails because the e¢ ciency of one unit
of income collected in taxes is less than one when invested in R&D. This can be
due for example to public nance costs, bureaucracy corruption, and public sector
inability to target R&D projects e¢ ciently. The model also considers the existence
of transaction costs in the private nancial sector.
Under these circumstances, R&D subsidies must be paired with patent protection.
This is the rst-best outcome, unless one the following scenarios occurs: (i) the public
sector is su¢ ciently ine¢ cient, in which case subsidies are not implemented; (ii) the
private nancial activity incurs in relatively large costs, making patent protection
socially undesirable.
The model can explain the observed simultaneous increase in both government
R&D spending and the strength of IPR. It occurs in our framework as the public
1Examples include the seminal contributions of Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991),
and Aghion and Howitt (1992). For a review of the market failures considered in the R&D literature
and policy analysis, see for example Acemoglu (2008).
2The study of optimal IPR goes back at least to Nordhaus (1968). More recent papers include
ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004), Eicher and Garcia-Penalosa (2008), and Acemoglu and Akcigit
(2012). Agnion and Tirole (1994) and Agnion and Howitt (1998) suggest that, in the absence of
IPR, information problems might be behind the inability of R&D subsidies to achieve the rst best.
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sector becomes more e¢ cient, because of the complementarity of private and public
innovation e¤ort. The impact on private and public R&D are, however, di¤erent
depending on who becomes more e¢ cient. While more e¢ cient public nance in-
creases the share of both private and public R&D in national income, a higher degree
of e¢ ciency in the nancial market rises the share of private innovation e¤ort but
diminishes the public one.
2 Model
Consider a closed economy similar to the one in Romer (1990) populated by utility-
maximizing innitely-lived consumers. There are three types of activities: consumption-
goods production, intermediate-goods manufacturing, and R&D investment. The
second sector operates under monopolistic competition, and the other two obey per-
fect competition. R&D is intended to create new designs for new types of producer
durables. In this economy, intellectual piracy can prevent the inventor from ap-
propriating any benet from his discoveries: when a new design is created, there is
a probability  that an intermediate-goods producer acquires the perpetual patent
over the design that allows monopoly pricing. The government chooses the levels of
patent protection  and subsidies to the R&D activity.
2.1 Households
A continuum of identical consumers of size L that grows at rate n inhabit the econ-
omy.3 Consumers are endowed with one unit of labor in each period that is supplied
inelastically. Their preferences are given by the following log-utility function:
U =
1Z
t
exp [ (j   t)] ln c(j) dj ; (1)
where c(j) is the amount of consumption per capita in period j, and  is the subjective
discount rate.
There is a capital market that supplies consumerssaving to intermediate-goods
producers that issue securities. The equilibrium interest rate r clears the market at
each point in time. The representative consumers feasibility constraint is then given
by
_a = w + (r   n)a  ct   h; (2)
3When not otherwise specied, variables refer to their values at date t where decisions are made.
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where w is the salary, a represent the value of the securities owned by each consumer,
and h  0 are taxes. Consumers choose the time series of consumption that max-
imizes (1) subject to (2). The rst order condition to this problem gives the Euler
equation for consumption per capita:
_c
c
= r   n  : (3)
2.2 Final goods
An homogeneous nal output Y is produced employing a variety of intermediate
capital goods x(i) according to
Y = L1 
Z A
0
[x(i)] di ; 0 <  < 1 ; (4)
Final-goods manufacturers are price takers, and earn zero prots in equilibrium.
Because intermediate goods are rented rather than sold, equation (4) implies that
they solve the following problem:
max
fL;x(i)g

L1 
Z A
0
[x(i)] di  ! L 
Z A
0
p(i)x(i) di

; (5)
where p(i) is the rental price of producer durable type i. For the interior solution to
this problem, the rst order conditions are
! = 
Y
L
(6)
p(i) = L1 [x(i)] 1 ; i 2 (0; A) . (7)
2.3 Producer durables
Firms in the intermediate sector can invest capital to buy patents on new versions
of intermediate goods. The patent provides a perpetual right to practice monopoly
pricing on sales of the purchased variety. Firms, however, can also obtain access to
the new knowledge with probability 1    through costless intellectual piracy. We
assume that this only occurs before the patent is sold, and that when an idea is stolen
from the inventor it becomes public knowledge that any rm can use. The value of  
depends on the degree of intellectual property protection chosen by the public sector.
The manufacturing process in this activity requires investing raw capital coming
from saved manufacturing output as follows: a unit of capital can be converted at no
cost into one unit of any variety of intermediate goods. There is no depreciation in
the model.
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The problem of intermediate-goods rms that buy a patent and become monop-
olists is
max
x(i)
[p(i)  r f ] x(i); (8)
where p(i) is given by equation (7), and the parameter  f represents a transaction
cost that depends on the e¢ ciency of nancial markets. In particular, for each unit
that agents want to invest, they incur in a cost of  f  1, that is, they need to borrow
 f  1 units.
The optimal solutions are standard in the literature. In particular, the price
charged by the monopolist is
p(i) =
r f

= p: (9)
And the amount of prots in the symmetric equilibrium, where x(i) = xM , equals:
(i) =

1  


r  f xM = M ; (10)
where from (7) and (9)
xM =

2
r f
1=(1 )
L: (11)
Firms that obtain the new idea through piracy will also solve (8) but taking p(i)
as given because they operate under perfect competition. The solution is now
p(i) = r f : (12)
As a consequence, all rms that fall into this class will produce the same amount
xC =


r f
1=(1 )
L; (13)
and prots in equilibrium will equal zero.
Comparing expression (11) and (13), we see that
xM = 
1=(1 ) xC : (14)
The amount of capital employed by monopolists is a fraction of the one rented by
perfect-competition rms, and this fraction rises with the elasticity of capital in nal-
goods production.
2.4 R&D sector
A large number of rms invest in R&D to create new varieties of intermediate goods
according to technology:
_A =  A R 1R, (15)
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where R is the amount of output investing in R&D, and R is its average across rms.
Even though the individual rm perceives constant returns, R&D investment at the
aggregate displays diminishing returns (0 <  < 1). In addition, there are intertem-
poral knowledge spillovers (0 <  < 1). There exist institutions that guarantee with
probability  that inventors can obtain patents on the new ideas that they generate.
There is free entry in the industry.
Patents not copied can be sold at a price PA. In equilibrium, investment in R&D
is pinned down by the zero prot condition
R
A
=  MA; (16)
where MA = _APA , that is, the maximum level of revenues attainable in the market
for patents, and A  1 captures the e¤ect of government subsidies on costs.
The fraction of government-nanced R&D in total R&D investment equals (A 
1)=A. Hence, it is proportional to the one of the private sector. The way subsidies
are introduced implies that public and private investment in innovation behave as
complementary. The policy-maker chooses the value of A necessary to complement
each unit of private R&D so as to achieve the social optimum.4
Finally, the evolution of the patent price must obey the following no-arbitrage
condition:
r =
 + _PA
 fPA
:
It says that investors in equilibrium are indi¤erent between investing in the capital
market and investing in the patent market.
2.5 Public sector
The government decide A and  . We assume that patent protection enforcement is
costless.5 As a consequence, the public sector collects lump-sum taxes to nance only
R&D subsidies. In particular,
hL  d =

A   1
A

R; (17)
where  d 2 (0; 1] is the e¢ ciency level of each unit collected in taxes.
4We could formalize this idea, for example, assuming that public subsidies mainly nance basic
R&D, whereas the private sector focuses on applied R&D. See David et al. (2000), among others,
for evidence on the complementarity between public and private R&D.
5Alternatively, we could assume that maintaining the intellectual property right system requires
spending equal to   R; where  > 0. This would not change the main results of the paper.
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The distortions captured by  d limit the capacity of the public sector to use taxes
e¢ ciently, and their size depends on the quality of institutions. We can think, for
example, that some taxes are lost in the collection process due to corruption, or that
one R&D unit nanced by government is less e¤ective than if nanced by the private
sector. The latter is consistent with Agnion and Howitts (1998) suggestion that the
public sector can have problems at targeting the right innovation projects due to
asymmetric and incomplete information.
2.6 Capital market clearing and optimal R&D share
The economys capital stock K must equal the sum of all units of intermediate goods
produced,
K =
Z A
0
x(i) di =  AxM + (1   )AxC :
Employing (14), we can write
K = A xC

1  (1  1=(1 ))  : (18)
As expected, K falls with the degree of intellectual-right protection  because the
industry moves away from perfect competition.
Expressions (7), (12) and (18) imply that
r = 

AL
K
1  1   1  1=(1 ) 1 
 f
: (19)
Higher transaction costs in nancial markets or a stronger degree of imperfect com-
petition lead to lower interest rates.
In the same way, combining (4) and (14), aggregate output takes the form:
Y = A L1  xC

1  (1  =(1 ))  : (20)
A larger  limits the amount of producer durables available for nal-goods manufac-
turing, and the amount of consumption goods.
It is also simple to obtain the optimal steady-state share of R&D in national
income (sR). From equations (13), (16) and (20)
sR =
R
Y
=
A  gA 
1=(1 )(1  )
 f [1  (1  =(1 )) ] (gA + ) ; (21)
where gA denotes the growth rate of variable A. The R&D share rises with intellectual
property protection and R&D subsidies, but is not a¤ected by the level of nancial
market development. Notice also that the expression says that R&D nanced by
the private sector sR=A only depends on  (positively) and the nancial cost  f
(negatively).
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3 Optimal R&D Policy
The social optimal allocation is obtained solving the central planners problem. The
policy-maker takes into consideration all the failures that the economy su¤ers. The
way some of these failures are introduced into the maximization problem is through
the aggregate form of the production functions, and that is why we derive them rst.
3.1 Aggregate production
Substituting (18) into (20), we nd that
Y = (AL)1 
(
1  (1  =(1 )) 1=
1  (1  1=(1 )) K
)
: (22)
This aggregate production function for consumption goods implies that new ideas are
a source of labor-augmenting technical change.
The quotient in expression (22) deserves further explanation. It is the result of
di¤erent producer durables being manufactured in industries with di¤erent competi-
tive structures. Because of diminishing returns to capital, it displays a U-shape with
respect to  that achieves a maximum value of 1 when all intermediate goods are
produced under the same competitive structure (i.e., when either  = 0 or  = 1),
and a minimum at  2 (0:5; 1). According to the nal-goods production, a xed K
should be then distributed equally among industries. However, besides this static
matter, the central planner must take into account that a larger degree of imperfect
competition has dynamics e¤ects on A and K.
Let us next focus on the R&D equation. All rms in the innovation sector invest
the same amounts of inputs. This equilibrium fact and expression (15) obtain the
aggregate production of ideas as
_A =  AR: (23)
A well known implication of equation (23) is that the steady-state growth rate of
designs is given by exogenous parameters. In particular, in order for _A=A to be a
constant along the balanced growth path, the growth rate of A1  must exactly match
the one of R. Notice next that function (22) and the feasibility constraint of the
economy imply that, at steady state, output and all types of investments grow in per
capita terms at the rate of the technological parameter that is, at gA. With this
information, it is immediate to show that the steady-state value of gA is given by
n=(1    ).
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3.2 The command-optimum
R&D policy variables are chosen so as to maximize the expected ow of utility of
a representative agent given the constraints of the economy. Substituting (16), (17)
and (22) into the economys feasibility constrain and the aggregate R&D technology,
we can write the governments problem as:
max
fC;  ; A; K; Ag
U =
1Z
0
exp( t) ln

C(j)
L

dj; (24)
subject to
(AL)1 
(
1  (1  =(1 )) 1=
1  (1  1=(1 )) K
)
= C + I +G; (25)
I =

_K +  MA

 f ; (26)
G =

A   1
 d

 MA; (27)
_A = A (A  MA)
 ; (28)
where C is aggregate consumption. For simplicity, we assume that the government
takesMA the potential market for patents as given. Equation (26) introduces the
transaction cost  f paid on borrowing for investing in capital accumulation and patent
purchase. Expression (27) gives government spending G, and is obtained combining
(16) and (17).
The st order conditions for the interior solution to this dynamic programming
problem are the following:
_C
C
= r   ; (29)
r = (1  )
_R
R
+
(1  )gA
sR
A

 f +
A 1
d

   f( )
; (30)
1
 d
   f =  A f( )
sR
; (31)
where
f( ) =
1  =(1 )
1  [1  =(1 )]  


1  1=(1 )
1  [1  1=(1 )] : (32)
The rst two conditions are the Euler equations for consumption and R&D spend-
ing, respectively. Expression (29) says that C grows at the optimum at the rate im-
plied by the interest rate, which gives the benet of saving and renouncing to current
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consumption, net of the subjective discounted rate that gives the cost. If the central
planner eliminates the monopoly pricing distortion then r = Y=( fK). Otherwise,
the interest rate is given by (19). In the same vein, Euler equation (30) requires that
in the optimum agents must be indi¤erent between investing an additional unit in
the capital market, which provides a return r, or allocating it to R&D, whose social
return is given by the RHS of condition (30).
Expression (31) provides the trade-o¤ between the two policy instruments  and
A. Their contribution to the accumulation of ideas is the same. They di¤er, however,
in terms of the costs imposed to the economy. The LHS of (31) implies that if the
government is ine¢ cient ( d < 1), R&D subsidies can be costly compared to private
R&D. Furthermore, if 1= d is su¢ ciently larger than  f , the optimal A becomes zero
and there are no subsidies to innovation. The opposite can also be true if nancial
markets are associate with relatively large transaction costs. In particular, when
 f is su¢ ciently bigger than 1= d, the social optimum is associated with absence of
patent protection. Focusing now on the RHS, it says that patent protection distorts
the industrys competitive structure. The aggregate e¤ect of this distortion can be
positive or negative. It is negative when the strictly decreasing function f( ) takes
on positive numbers, which occurs for values of  su¢ ciently small ( <  ). In the
interior solution where both patent protection and subsidies are employed, the two
costs must be equalized.
Let us concentrate on balanced-growth path outcomes, and more specically, on
the ones related to the case in which both instruments are used simultaneously, be-
cause this is what we observe in reality. To guarantee the interior solution, we assume
that  d f 2 ( ; 1) for some  su¢ ciently large, and that  <  . Combining (21) and
(31) deliver the following expression that denes  as a function of only  d,  f , gA, 
and :
1  1  =(1 ) 
1  [1  1=(1 )] =
1
 [1  1=(1 )]

1  =(1 )   gA

1
 d f
  1

(1  )1=(1 )
gA + 

:
(33)
In expression (33), the LHS is strictly increasing in  and always greater or equal
than 1. As a consequence, intellectual property protection becomes stronger if  f d
rise or gA decreases when both policy instruments coexist. We obtain that a more
e¢ cient government (higher  d) has stronger IPR because the impact of  on R
depends positively on A.
Equation (33) also implies that when the transaction costs increase, the govern-
ment tends to stronger patent protection to incentive R&D investment. A larger
transaction cost in nancial markets can be as well interpreted for R&D rms as a
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larger risk premium. Then, the model predictions are consistent with the increase in
patent protection that followed the change in nancial regulations introduced in the
U.S. to encourage venture capital into hi-tech rms (e.g., See Coriat and Orsi 2002).
We now turn to the optimal R&D subsidy A. Combining (30), (31) and (33), we
obtain
A =  d  f
"
1
 
  1 + =(1 )
(1  )gA + 
#
gA + 
1=(1 )
: (34)
Because  rises with  d f , A can go down or up. If the e¤ect of  d f on the RHS
dominates, an increase in these parameters will bring an increase in A. In that case,
a more e¢ cient government or a more ine¢ cient nancial sector will call for a higher
innovation subsidization rate.
Finally, using expressions (21) and (34), the steady-state share of government-
nanced R&D equals
sR

A   1
A

= gA (1  )

 d  f
(1  )gA +   
 1=(1 )
(gA + ) [1  (1  =(1 )) ]

:
(35)
Again, because both terms inside brackets go up with  d f , the net e¤ect on government-
nanced R&D is unclear.
Figure 1: Evolution of the two R&D policy tools against income per capita
Sources: Public R&D share computed using gross domestic expenditure in R&D nanced by government
from OECD Science and Technology Statistics 2007; Real GDP per capita from Penn World Tables;
Patent protection index from Park (2008). Sample: Unbalanced panel formed by 28 OECD nations, ve-
year averages for the period 1981-2005.
To shed some more light on the predictions of the model, let us carry out a brief
quantitative analysis using empirically-supported parameter values. In particular,
pick  = 0:34,  = 0:25, n = 0:01, gA = 0:02 and  = 0:04, which imply values of
r = 0:06 and  = 0:65, and are appropriate for the US economy (e.g., see Perez-
Sebastian 2007). Under this parameterization,  = 0:67, and both  and the share
of public R&D increase with  d f for any  d f > 0:39. This positive correlation
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between the two policy tools is what we observe in the data. For example, we can see
it in Figure 1 that displays the evolution on patent protection and the public R&D
share against the level of GDP per capita across nations.
4 Conclusion
R&D policy is one of the most important items in the public policy agenda. The lack
of an e¢ cient public R&D strategy is many times blamed for low economic growth,
low wages, large unemployment rates, and even trade decits. Two are the main
types of actions that the public sector employes to promote R&D: patent protection
and R&D subsidies. This paper has tried to improve our understanding of the design
and evolution of these two R&D policy instruments.
Our main contribution has been building a theory that can formally explain the
coexistence of IPR and R&D subsidies. In sharp contrast to more standard R&D-
based growth models, R&D subsidies in our model can not achieve the rst best due
to the existence of government ine¢ ciencies. The model is able to explain as well the
increase in government R&D and the strength of IPR along the development path
as a consequence of an improvement in government e¢ ciency in spending relative to
the private sector.
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